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The eurozone crisis has increased demand for cheap labour
across Europe. However, the return of EU internal migration
controls is unlikely.
by Blog Admin
Rather than reducing labour migration flows within the European Union, the economic crisis
seems to have amplified them. Alexandre Afonso  argues that the return of internal
migration controls within the EU is unlikely, and that domestic battles about the regulation of
migrant employment may give rise to surprising alliances.
Many had expected that the economic crisis would reduce labour migration f lows within
the European Union, and yet the opposite seems to have been the case. The deep
recession in the European periphery has led to a mass exodus of  young workers f rom
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece to other parts of  Europe, and migration f lows f rom central and
Eastern Europe to the EU15 have continued to grow despite the crisis. The economic downturn and
austerity policies have led many companies to squeeze costs, thereby boosting the demand f or cheaper
migrant labour. Af ter the “Polish plumber” controversy in France in 2005, or Gordon Brown’s inf amous
“Brit ish Jobs f or Brit ish Workers” speech a couple of  years ago, the debates about labour movements
within the EU are gaining a new momentum. Cases of  exploitation of  migrant workers f rom Eastern
Europe have notably made the headlines recently in the United Kingdom.
In a context of  high unemployment and mounting Euroscepticism, polit icians on the Lef t and the Right
seem to be turning to labour market protectionism as a way to respond to voters’ concerns. Last year,
Spain was the f irst country to use its saf eguard clause in the enlargement treaty to temporarily restrict
access to its labour market f or Romanian workers. The Brit ish Home Secretary, Theresa May, recently
announced that she would push f or curbs in the f ree movement of  workers in f uture EU negotiations,
while David Cameron declared earlier this year that the UK was ready to enf orce “stringent border
controls” should Greece leave the eurozone. Labour leader Ed Miliband declared in June that his own
party had “got it wrong” by allowing too many Eastern European immigrants into the United Kingdom. He
notably advocated the introduction of  quotas of  f oreign workers to ease the pressure on wages and
public services.
However, unless the eurozone actually
breaks apart – or if  the United Kingdom
leaves the Union – the permanent
reintroduction of  measures of  migration
control within the EU seems unrealistic
as it would override a now gigantic body
of  EU legislation. It would also f ace the
staunch opposition of  the countries in
the East and the South that are net
exporters of  labour. Similarly, the
harmonisation of  social standards and
labour law at EU level, which could
guarantee a level-playing f ield f or
cross- labour mobility, is not going to
materialise in the near f uture, nor is a
f iscal union which could temper socio-
economic imbalances within the EU. At present, the only arenas where the impact of  EU migration on
wages and employment can be ef f ectively regulated are within member states themselves, f or instance
through minimum wages, labour inspection, collective bargaining arrangements or rules applying to work
agencies and gangmasters. In these domains as well, the margin of  manoeuvre of  member states is now
severely limited by a number of  rulings of  the European Court of  Justice.
In many member states, trade unions and employers play a central role in these domestic regulation
battles about labour mobility, and the conf lict lines between them are not always those that one would
expect. Labour market conf licts are of ten understood around a classical class cleavage: trade unions
seek to protect acquired rights through regulations, while employers push f or liberal policies and de-
regulation. In an article recently published, I show that employers can actually support or consent to
regulations to protect wage standards and the enf orcement of  labour law in the context of  labour
mobility. Dif f erent employers may pursue dif f erent policy strategies depending on their market posit ion,
the strength of  trade unions they have to f ace, or the risk of  public intervention.
By virtue of  Single Market rules, the f ree movement of  workers and services has created new
opportunit ies f or regime-shopping, that is, the possibility f or companies to use the more business-
f riendly regulations of  one member state to provide services in another member state. For instance,
construction companies can set up shop in low-wage countries and bring in workers f rom these
countries in order to circumvent the social standards of  the countries in which the work is actually done.
This is notably what happened in the much debated Laval case: a company was contracted to build a
school in Sweden, but employed Latvian workers whose wages had been agreed with Latvian unions,
obviously at lower rates. However, companies that are directly threatened by this f orm of  competit ion,
and which cannot directly lower their wage costs due to militant trade unions at home, may push f or the
establishment of  binding minimum wages as a barrier to entry f or competitors.
They may also strike compromises with trade unions to push f or more labour market regulation. These
alliances were notably present in countries such as Austria and Switzerland, and recent research on a
large sample of  companies in Germany indeed shows that employers in a number of  economic sectors
f avour minimum wages as a barrier to entry. Besides, even in countries where the power relationship
among f irms is unf avourable to the pro-regulation stance, such as Ireland, employers may still consent
to labour market regulations negotiated with trade unions rather than unilateral interventions by
governments. In a f ield of  growing polit ical concern, employers may pref er rules that they can shape,
rather than having regulations imposed on them by governments at the behest of  public opinion.
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